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introduction: Western Area (WA) of Sierra Leone including the capital, Freetown, expe-
rienced an unprecedented outbreak of Ebola from 2014 to 2015. At the onset of the 
epidemic, there was little information about the epidemiology, transmission dynamics, 
and risk factors in urban settings as previous outbreaks were limited to rural/semi-rural 
settings. This study, therefore, aimed to describe the epidemiology of the outbreak and 
the factors which had most impact on the transmission of the epidemic and whether 
there were different drivers from those previously described in rural settings.
Methods: We conducted a descriptive epidemiology study in WA, Sierra Leone using 
secondary data from the National Ebola outbreak database. We also reviewed the Ebola 
situation reports, response strategy documents, and other useful documents.
results: A total of 4,955 Ebola cases were identified between June 2014 and November 
2015, although there were reports of cases occurring in WA toward end of May. All 
wards were affected, and Waterloo Area I (Ward 330), the capital city of Western Area 
Rural District, recorded the highest numbers of cases (580) and deaths (236). Majority 
of cases (63.4%) and deaths (66.8%) were in WA Urban District (WAU); 44 cases were 
imported from other provinces. Only 20% of cases had a history of contact with an 
Ebola case, and more than 30% were death alerts. Equal numbers of males and females 
were infected, and very few cases (3.2%) were health workers. Overall, transmission 
was through contact with infected individuals, and intense transmission occurred at 
the community level. In WAU, transmission was mostly between neighbors and among 
Abbreviations: CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; CFR, case fatality rate; DSO, district surveillance officer; 
ETC, Ebola treatment center; EVD, Ebola virus disease; MOHS, Ministry of Health and Sanitation; MSF, Médecins Sand 
Frontières; NERC, National Ebola Resource Centre; OR, odds ratio; UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund; VHF, viral 
hemorrhagic fever; WA, Western Area; WAR, Western Area Rural District; WAU, Western Area Urban District; WHO, World 
Health Organization; ZEBOV, Zaire ebolavirus.
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inTrODUcTiOn
Sierra Leone experienced a major and widespread outbreak 
of Ebola virus disease (EVD) between 2014 and 2015 (1). The 
Eastern Province of Sierra Leone was the first to be affected and, 
by August 2014, the disease had spread to the other regions of the 
country: Western Area (WA), Northern, and Southern Provinces. 
The outbreak resulted in an officially reported total number of 
8,991 probable and confirmed cases and 3,955 deaths country-
wide (2). The WA Region, comprising only 2 of the country’s 
14 districts registered more than half of the reported cases and 
deaths.
To date, five species of the Ebola virus have been identified 
since the virus was discovered in 1976. It is the Zaire ebolavirus 
(ZEBOV), Bundibugyo ebolavirus, and Sudan ebolavirus that have 
so far caused dramatic outbreaks, mostly in Central and East 
Africa, and in South Africa, with high case fatality that ranged 
between 50 and 100% (3, 4). Gatherer (5) summarized eight 
separate outbreaks of ZEBOV reported between 1976 and 2008, 
each of which involved somewhere between 12 and 319 cases. As 
reported by Baize et al. (6), the outbreak in Sierra Leone, which 
occurred as an extension of the widespread 2013–2016 West 
African outbreak of Ebola, was due to ZEBOV.
The 2013–2016, West African outbreak of Ebola originated in 
Guinea and crossed geographical boundaries, affecting at least 
six African countries and more than three urban settings for 
the first time in history. Unlike previous Ebola outbreaks, which 
were mostly limited to rural areas or semi-urban settings, this 
epidemic introduced EVD into urban areas of WA, including 
Freetown Municipality (5). With close to 5,000 cases of Ebola, 
the outbreak in WA is almost 16 times more acute than any of the 
previous outbreaks attributed to ZEBOV, affecting about 12 times 
more people than the 2000–2002 Ebola outbreak in Uganda, 
which had previously been considered the worst Ebola outbreak 
on record (7).
At the onset of the epidemic, there was little information about 
the epidemiology, transmission dynamics, and risk factors in 
urban settings. It was believed that the urban and peri-urban con-
text may itself be a factor that contributed to the unprecedented 
scale of the outbreak; indeed, the two major cities, Freetown 
Municipality and Waterloo Area 1 became major transmission 
hubs linked to cases elsewhere in the country and beyond. The 
objective of this study was, therefore, to describe the epidemiol-
ogy of the disease in an urban setting of Sierra Leone including 
the factors which had the most impact on the transmission of the 
epidemic. Specifically, the study reviewed the drivers and patterns 
of transmission which may have resulted in the observed sus-
tained transmission, and whether the drivers were different from 
those previously described in rural settings. The ultimate aim is 
to inform effective responses to future outbreaks of Ebola and 
other highly infectious diseases in similar urban settings, so as to 
be able to limit the excessive morbidity and mortality observed 
in this outbreak.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
study Design
We conducted a descriptive epidemiological study of the EVD 
outbreak in WA from 2014 to 2015. Quantitative and qualitative 
data for the study were obtained from the National EVD case-
based database, an essential element of the active surveillance 
undertaken as part of the outbreak response; the district outbreak 
investigations and situation update reports; the district-specific 
response strategies; and other pertinent documents related to 
occurrence and reporting of cases and trends in WA.
Description of the Outbreak  
setting, Wa Districts
Covering an area of 557  km2, WA is the smallest of the four 
administrative regions of Sierra Leone, yet the most densely 
populated, with an estimated population of about 1.4 million 
people (8). Western Area Urban (WAU) and Western Area 
Rural (WAR)—the two districts that constitute WA—comprise 
12 cities/towns and 15 villages. The WA is further subdivided 
into 69 administrative wards: 20 wards in WAR (Wards 326–45) 
and 49 in WAU/Freetown Municipality (Wards 346–94). With 
an estimated population of 1.2 million people, WAU/Freetown 
Municipality is the largest city of Sierra Leone (9). It is home 
to virtually all ethnicities from all over the country with high 
population movement to and from the Provinces. In 2014, 
the population density of WAU was 1,224 people per square 
inhabitants of shared accommodations. The drivers of transmission included high pop-
ulation movement to and from WA, overcrowding, fear and lack of trust in the response, 
and negative community behaviors. Transmission was mostly through contact and with 
limited transmission through sex and breast milk.
conclusion: The unprecedented outbreak in WA was attributed to delayed detection, 
inadequate preparedness and response, intense population movements, overcrowding, 
and unresponsive communities. Anticipation, strengthening preparedness for early 
detection, and swift and effective response remains critical in mitigating a potential urban 
explosion of similar future outbreaks.
Keywords: ebola virus disease, outbreak, epidemiology, risk factors, urban setting, Western area districts, sierra 
leone
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kilometer. Most people reside in informal settlements, in 
substandard living conditions, and with an average of 6–10 
individuals in a single room. The region, like the rest of the 
country, is home to a young population, with a significant 
proportion (42%) below 15 years of age (9). Waterloo Area I is 
the capital for WAR, with good road connection to WAU and 
to elsewhere in the country.
study Method
Case Definitions
Case identification was aided by the use of three EVD case 
definitions; suspect, probable, and confirmed case. A suspect 
case was defined as “any severely ill patient with history of 
fever 38.5°C of less than 3 weeks duration with vomiting and 
diarrhea, with or without any one of the following manifesta-
tions: abdominal pains, epistaxis, general body weakness, 
hematemesis, muscle or joint pain, hemoptysis, haemorrhagic 
or purpuric rash, blood in stool, haemorrhagic symptoms from 
any other site, conjunctival infections, and with no known 
predisposing factors for the haemorrhagic manifestations.” A 
probable case was defined as “any person meeting the suspected 
case definition criteria (above) and has had contact with a 
suspect, probable or a confirmed case/death within the previous 
21  days of onset of disease symptoms; or any unexplained 
death.” A confirmed case was considered to be “any suspected 
or probable case that is laboratory confirmed by one or more of 
the following tests; detection of Ebola antigen in any body fluid, 
tissue, or clinical specimen by antigen detection enzyme-linked 
immunosorbent assay (ELISA) or immunohistochemistry; or 
demonstration of serum IgM or IgG antibodies by ELISA; 
or detection of Ebola nucleic acid by reverse-transcriptase 
polymerase reaction.”
Ebola alert cases were identified using EVD alert case defini-
tion which was “Fever and at least three of the following symp-
toms: vomiting, headache, nausea, diarrhea, difficulty breathing, 
fatigue, abdominal pain, loss of appetite, muscle or joint pain, 
unexplained bleeding, difficult swallowing, or hiccups.”
active surveillance for ebola in Wa
In line with the World Health Organization (WHO) recommen-
dations for Ebola control, public health responders led by the 
national government and with technical support from WHO, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF), and other partners implemented an active surveillance 
system for EVD in WA during the outbreak response period. The 
active surveillance system was linked to the other components of 
the response system and entailed active case finding and alerting; 
case investigation, including laboratory testing of the alert cases 
for EVD; identification and listing of contacts of confirmed and 
probable EVD cases; and monitoring of high-risk contacts for a 
duration of 21 days. Alerts were derived from the EVD live and 
dead alerts (Figure 1).
Using the case definitions, trained community volunteers 
worked closely with district surveillance officers (DSOs) and 
epidemiologist to conduct active case finding and investigations 
in households, health facilities, and clinics. Any case fulfilling the 
alert case definition was referred to an Ebola treatment Centre 
(ETC), where samples were collected for testing. Swabs were 
routinely collected from all dead alert cases prior to a safe and 
dignified burial. Data were structured in the form of individual 
case information, based on information collected on site by way 
of a standardized case investigation form. The monitoring of 
contacts was done by way of a structured contact monitoring 
form. For each probable and confirmed case, collected data 
included geographical location, demographic information, case 
status on identification (dead or alive), exposure history, signs 
and symptoms, date of onset and date of reporting, laboratory 
results, admission status, and illness outcomes, including final 
case classification. EVD laboratories and the ETCs managed 
their respective data, but they shared critical information 
such as laboratory test results and patient outcomes with the 
surveillance team. This information was then used to update the 
individual case investigation forms, make final case classifica-
tion, and update disease outcomes of probable and confirmed 
cases in the national EVD database. The implementation of the 
surveillance system was slow and under resourced in the begin-
ning and was only improved and became fully functional from 
around March 2015.
At the height of the epidemic, when the caseloads over-
whelmed existing capacities for response, all alert cases were 
considered suspect cases until they were tested. Suspect cases 
were discarded if negative, or reclassified as a confirmed EVD 
case following a positive test result. Individuals who were 
recorded as alert or suspect cases but died and were buried 
before sample collection for laboratory testing were classified as 
probable cases if they had a history of being in contact with a 
confirmed case of EVD. All contacts of probable and confirmed 
cases were recorded and monitored for a period of 21 days, the 
maximum duration of EVD incubation. To facilitate monitoring, 
movements of affected contacts were restricted through home 
quarantine of all households with confirmed or probable cases 
for 21 days. If households were overcrowded and associated with 
a potential risk of in-house transmission, offsite quarantine for 
high-risk contacts was implemented for the same 21-day period. 
Offsite quarantine meant that high-risk contacts were voluntar-
ily and temporarily moved to a designated site, away from their 
household members, to facilitate monitoring and to prevent 
contamination of household members in the event of developing 
disease symptoms.
Data collection
For the quantitative component of the study, we extracted all 
EVD data for WA (for the period 2014–2015) from the national 
EVD database. We also reviewed selected national and WHO 
daily situation updates and investigation reports, including dis-
trict-specific response strategy documents. In all the documents, 
we abstracted information for the characterization of the disease 
epidemiology, including drivers of transmission and propagation 
of the outbreak in WA. Key information sought included daily 
new cases, exposure history and contact information, how and 
when the case was identified, positive swabs, reports of secret 
burials, and missing contacts. We linked the information and 
used them to identify and deduce possible drivers of transmission 
FigUre 1 | algorithm for ebola outbreak surveillance in Western area of sierra leone: 2014–2015.
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during different phases of the outbreak. In case of information 
gap and possible clues, the abstracted information was verified 
and additional information sought from the DSOs.
Data analysis
Data analysis was carried out using Microsoft Excel and the 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS version 18). The 
first phase of the analysis involved determining what proportion 
of all alert cases identified in WA between June 1, 2014 and 
November 7, 2015 were classified as probable or confirmed EVD 
cases. Descriptive analysis of the EVD probable and confirmed 
cases was performed in terms of distribution of cases over time, 
and by location, demographic characteristics, history of exposure, 
and disease symptoms. Qualitative analysis entailed abstraction 
and synthesis of relevant information from available reports and 
documents.
ethical considerations
The quantitative data for the study were collected as part of the 
active surveillance and epidemiological investigations of EVD 
alert cases, a component of the outbreak response interventions. 
Qualitative information was also generated during the outbreak 
response efforts. Clearance for the study and for its publication 
was obtained from the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MOHS) 
in Sierra Leone, and WHO.
resUlTs
general
A total of 37,847 alert cases were investigated during the epi-
demic period; 4,955 (13.1%) of them were classified as cases 
(3,966 confirmed and 989 probable). A total of 3,142 cases 
(63.4%) had been infected and detected in WAU/Freetown 
FigUre 2 | epidemic curve of confirmed and probable ebola virus 
disease cases in Western area: 2014–2015.
Table 1 | classification status of ebola virus disease (eVD) alert cases investigated by districts, Western area, 2014–2015.
eVD status final case classification
District of case Total alerts Probable 
cases (P)
confirmed 
cases (c)
not cases numbers/
proportion of alerts 
by district that are 
eVD cases
N n % n % n % N (P + C) %
Western Area rural (WAR) 13,341 310 2.3 1,343 10.1 11,688 87.6 1,653 12.4
Western Area urban/Freetown Municipality (WAU) 23,640 647 2.7 2,495 10.6 20,498 86.7 3,142 13.3
Originating in one of 12 other districts 369 10 2.7 34 9.2 325 88.1 44 11.9
Unspecified location 496 22 4.4 94 19.0 380 76.6 116 23.4
Grand total 37,847 989 2.6 3,966 10.5 32,891 86.9 4,955 13.1
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Municipality, 1,653 cases (33.4%) were from WAR, and 44 cases 
(0.9%) originated from the other 12 districts of Sierra Leone and 
were detected in WA (see Table 1). These data did not capture 
individuals potentially exposed and infected from WA and 
escaped to other Provinces before detection.
epidemic Detection and recognition in Wa
The first official notification of the outbreak extension into WAU 
and Freetown Municipality was on July 12, 2014, following con-
firmation that a foreign national, an Egyptian who had traveled 
from Kenema, the largest city in the Eastern Province had checked 
himself into a private clinic (10). The epidemic curve, however, 
shows that the first EVD case in WAU/Freetown Municipality 
had a reported onset date in the second week of June 2014, while 
the first reported EVD case in WAR was recorded during the 
first week of July 2014 (see Figure  2). On the other hand, the 
National Ebola Response Centre (NERC) situation update report 
on 25th March 2015 indicated fairly high numbers of cases being 
recognized in WA as early as the end of May 2014. Retrospective 
verification and validation revealed that earlier cases occurred 
in Waterloo Area I (Ward 330) around May 2014, following an 
influx of high-risk contacts who had fled from Port Loko district 
and took refuge with relatives. Waterloo Area I is one of the 20 
wards, the largest city, and is the district capital for WAR. This 
information was confirmed by one of the surveillance officers in 
WA, who reported that initial clusters of EVD in WA was in an 
area known as Fudia Terrace, in Money Bush in Waterloo Area 
I, WAR District. The disease had been introduced into this area 
through exposed contacts and symptomatic individuals fleeing 
from clusters of transmission in Port Loko District. The epidemic 
reportedly spread to WAU through movement of symptomatic 
individuals and high-risk contacts who went into hiding. While 
the above point to the fact that the epidemic in WA most likely 
started from Waterloo Area I in WA sometime in May 2014, it 
was difficult to identify the actual index case and when the case 
was introduced.
Distribution of eVD cases in the Wa over 
Time
As per the EVD epidemic curve (see Figure 2), the outbreak lasted 
14 months (56 epidemic weeks) in WAU and nine (9) months (36 
epidemic weeks) in WAR. From the combined epidemic curve, 
the number of cases for WA increased exponentially from epi-
week 34 and peaked in week 48 (November–December 2014). By 
the beginning of 2015, the weekly number of cases had dropped 
significantly, and there was sustained low-level transmission, 
resulting in a prolonged tail end of the epidemic curve. Smaller 
spikes were observed between epi-weeks 5 and 11 of 2015, and 
between epi-weeks 23 and 25 of 2015.
The epidemic curve in WAR followed a pattern similar to that 
of WAU, except for the size and duration of the epidemic. WAU 
experienced a sustained transmission and propagation of the 
epidemic, with varying intensities of transmission throughout the 
outbreak phase. WAR, on the other hand, experienced one major 
epidemic followed by two separate re-introductions of cases that 
had originated in WAU, in May and in July 2015.
geographic Distribution of eVD cases and 
Deaths in Wa, 2014–2015
All the 20 wards of WAR and 48 of the 49 wards in WAU 
recorded cases at various times during the epidemic. The only 
ward for which the viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) database did 
not capture any documented EVD cases was Ward 351 (Bottom 
Oku village) in WAU. However, according to one of the DSOs 
FigUre 3 | incidence rate per 1,000 population of ebola virus disease by Ward in Western area (Wa): 2014–2015.
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in WA, cases were indeed reported from this ward even if not 
captured in the VHF database. The areas with the highest num-
ber of cases recorded in WAU were Allen Town I and II (Ward 
347) with 213 cases and 78 deaths, Congo Water II (Ward 352) 
with 134 cases and 47 deaths, and Fourah Bay (Ward 369) with 
103 cases and 20 deaths. The other wards in WAU reported cases 
ranging from 6 to 86 per ward. In WAR, the highest numbers 
of cases were reported from Waterloo Area I Area I (Ward 330) 
with 580 cases and 236 deaths, and the other 19 wards reported 
cases ranging from 7 to 83 per ward. Up to 634 cases (12.8%) 
and 201 deaths did not have their location or addresses specified. 
Figure 3 present the incident rate of EVD/1,000 population by 
wards in WA. Table  2 compares the proportion of confirmed 
cases that were death alerts (positive swabs) by district. Overall, 
the percentage of confirmed cases arising from death alerts was 
slightly higher in WAR (40.2%) than in WAU (31.7% WAU). 
The positive swabs represent cases confirmed after death, and 
not during illness.
sociodemographic characteristics of 
cases
The ratio of male to female EVD cases, irrespective of the district 
of residence, was 1:1. About 22.4% of the cases were students, 
14.6% were business communities, and 12.0% were children. An 
estimated 3.2% of the cases were health-care workers, and 0.4% 
were traditional healers. Most of the infected heath-care workers 
were from WAU.
illness Presentation and exposure
Many of the cases presented with the typically known symptoms 
of EVD (Table 3). Very few cases reported unexplained bleed-
ing. Only 20.1% of cases in WAU and 24.5% of cases in WAR 
reported being in contact with a known EVD suspect or patient 
prior to becoming ill. The 20% of cases with reported history 
of contact with a known EVD case in WAU indicated they had 
been exposed to a sick neighbor or a friend, while most of the 
Table 3 | symptoms associated with eVD in Western area (N = 2,720).
symptoms reporteda Frequency of 
reporting
Percentage 
reporting
Fever 2,163 79.50
Fatigue 2,085 76.65
Anorexia 2,006 73.75
Headache 1,530 56.25
Muscle pain 1,497 55.04
Joint pain 1,456 53.53
Abdominal pain 1,379 50.70
Vomiting 1,352 49.71
Diarrhea 1,151 42.32
Difficult breathing 704 25.88
Conjunctivitis 633 23.27
Difficult swallowing 589 21.65
Unexplained bleeding 109 4.00
Bleeding from other sites (stool, injection 
sites, etc.)
2–6 0.07–0.22
aOther minor reported symptoms included chest pain, jaundice, rashes, and hiccups.
Table 2 | Proportion of laboratory-confirmed cases by case status, 
districts, and the most affected wards in Western area rural (War) and 
Western area Urban (WaU).
Variable WaU/
Freetown  
N (%)
War  
N (%)
Ward 330 
War  
N (%)
Ward 347 
(WaU) N 
(%)
Total lab-confirmed 
deaths
2,495 1,343 580 213
Confirmed swabs 
from dead alerts
791 (31.70) 540 (40.21) 236 (40.69) 78 (36.6)
Confirmed samples 
from live alerts
1,678 (67.25) 796 (59.27) 340 (58.62) 132 (62.0)
Missing status after 
disaggregation 
(swab/blood)
26 (1.04) 7 (0.52) 4 (0.69) 3 (1.4)
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cases with known history of contact in WAR had been in contact 
with close sick family or household members. Overall, qualita-
tive information reviewed showed that transmission was mostly 
through contact with symptomatic individuals or dead bodies; 
however, information on the type of contact was missing and 
could not be quantified. Transmission to babies through breast 
milk was documented, and there were a few reports of potential 
sexual transmission.
Drivers of Transmission
The frequently reported drivers of transmission varied during 
the different phases, although some of them persisted through 
all phases of the outbreak. For example, the first half of the 
epidemic response was characterized by lack of or inadequate 
diagnostic and isolation capabilities, poor community health-
seeking behavior, and management of ill health, including self-
diagnosis, treatment of febrile illnesses using over-the-counter 
medication or herbal treatment, and a reliance on traditional 
healers. These factors were compounded by overcrowding as 
well as excessive population movements into and out of WA, 
and between WAU and WAR. Moreover, the initial phase of 
the outbreak response was characterized by a lack of resources, 
including inadequate capacities for surveillance that hampered 
early case detection.
The affected individuals and communities exhibited extreme 
fear: high-risk contacts and EVD-symptomatic individuals fled 
from one place to another. There were numerous reports of 
individuals exposed in WA taking refuge in their home districts 
to secure family support and care during their illnesses, while 
individuals exposed in other parts of the country with ongoing 
transmission fled from their districts to take refuge in WA, in an 
attempt to escape from the outbreak. Up to December of 2014, 
there were anecdotal reports of contacts and ill persons escaping 
quarantine homes from the other Provinces and coming to WAU/
Freetown through Waterloo Area I Area I (Ward 330).
From January until the end of the outbreak, frequently 
observed and reported factors that exacerbated the rate of 
transmission included secret burials, high-risk contacts con-
cealing exposure history or running away and getting lost to 
follow-up, communities hiding the sick and nursing patients 
from home, and a high number of positive cases derived from 
death alerts. Up until May 2015, there were reports of deaths 
or secret burials in quarantine homes despite daily monitor-
ing of high-risk contacts for symptom developments. Some of 
the symptomatic contacts were reportedly taking antipyretics 
or herbal remedies to lower body temperatures before contact 
tracers checked them.
Some of the high-risk events that propagated the epidemic 
were attributed to a lack of community trust in the response and 
the fear of not having family members return back home after 
isolation. In WAU, many households with reported confirmed 
cases were found to be overcrowded, sometimes with up to 10 
individuals in a room, many of whom were not related but sharing 
the establishment to share the cost of the rent. Between June and 
August 2015, there were a few reports of transmission to babies 
through breast milk and possible sexual transmission. There were 
widespread reports of families washing dead bodies even before 
calling the burial team to implement safe and dignified burial. 
Washing of dead bodies is a sociocultural practice engrained in 
these communities.
illness Outcomes
The overall case fatality for WA for the duration of the outbreak 
was 36.7%, although WAR registered an overall higher case fatal-
ity of 43.2%. All age groups were affected during the epidemic. 
When disaggregated by age, the data show that the highest fatality 
rate occurred among babies under the age of 1-year old (73.26%) 
and individuals over 65  years, recording about 69.76% dead 
(Table 4). Up to 31.7 and 42.1% of confirmed cases in WAU and 
WAR, respectively, were identified as death alerts.
DiscUssiOn
Most previous outbreaks of Ebola were limited to rural areas (4) 
and were easier to contain. Thus, not many people anticipated 
that an Ebola outbreak could spread to an urban center and 
spin out of control to become a public health emergency of 
international concern. This study provides insights into the 
disease epidemiology in one of the worst hit urban settings 
Table 4 | aggregated age-specific case fatality in Wa, June 2014–
november 2015.
age group (years) Total  
cases (N)
% missing 
records
Dead (N) age-specific 
fatality (%)
N %
<1 172 2 1.15 126 73.26
1–5 422 5 1.17 184 43.60
6–14 530 7 1.30 133 25.09
15–29 1,493 14 0.93 376 25.18
30–49 1,446 15 1.03 537 37.14
50–64 396 6 1.49 203 51.26
65+ 291 0 0.00 203 69.76
Age not indicated 144 11 7.10 54 37.50
Total 4,954 60 1.21 1,816 36.66
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during the first and unprecedented West African outbreak of 
Ebola in a low-income developing country. It also sheds light 
on some of the drivers and underlying factors for transmission 
that should be considered in similar context and comparable 
outbreak response efforts in the future.
Our study identified 4,955 probable and confirmed cases 
from the VHF database, a figure that is higher than what has 
been reported by the Sierra Leone MOHS, and the WHO by 
slightly more than 1,500 cases. The WHO reports of 3,449 cases 
(2). Even then, the data from the VHF database did not capture 
the earlier cases who were reported to be fleeing from Port-Loko 
into Waterloo Area I from around May 2014 when the outbreak 
probably spilled over into WA. This and the widespread reports 
of secret burials are possibly suggestive that even our figure 
is an underestimate. We believe that the discrepancies in the 
reported data and what could be the actual cases and death are 
attributed to gaps in the surveillance system as well existence 
of several disjointed databases, all of which were incomplete 
and could not be easily linked. Conceivably, the surveillance 
system was not able to detect all individuals with the clinical 
disease who intentionally evaded being tested or those who 
died and were buried without notification and/or laboratory 
confirmation. This is true for all phases of the response includ-
ing the second and later phases of the outbreak response where 
reporting were based on laboratory-confirmed cases. Perhaps, 
these observations, also explain the higher numbers of probable 
cases reported in this study as compared to the official figures 
reported by MOHS and by WHO. These discrepancies in the 
reported surveillance data had earlier on been reported by Hui-
Jun et al. (11) and the WHO ERT (1).
The disease epidemiology and insight into the underlying 
factors and drivers of sustained transmission highlight a number 
of lessons for the future. The outbreak in WA spilled over from 
ongoing transmission from the other Provinces. Despite the 
knowledge about ongoing EVD transmission in the other dis-
tricts of Sierra Leone and the significantly increased population 
movements from all districts into WA for a variety of reasons, 
as observed by Chan (12), it appears that there was no antici-
pation that the outbreak could easily spill over into Freetown 
Municipality. As such, measures for preparedness and enhanced 
early warning and alerting system that should have been put in 
place to facilitate early detection was non-existent. It appears 
that the response was focused on containing the outbreak in 
the affected Provinces without measures to shield and protect 
the national Capital City and the surrounding suburb given the 
high population movements or at the minimum, conduct risk 
assessment and preparedness, including enhanced surveillance 
for early detection and swift response.
It is no doubt that the outbreak in WA was detected fairly late 
due to lack of diagnostic capabilities and the fact that sympto-
matic and high-risk contacts made every effort to conceal their 
symptoms. It was, therefore, impossible to determine the index 
case and the exact time when the outbreak was first introduced 
into WA districts. The intentional and persistent denial of the 
possible outbreak extension by community members, and failure 
to anticipate and appreciate possible implications by public health 
authorities and implement appropriate measures, resulted in the 
late detection of the outbreak in WA.
Unlike most previous EVD outbreaks in rural or semi-rural 
settings that were mostly limited in geographical scope, and 
tended to spread relatively more slowly (3, 13), the epidemic in 
WA was characterized by an unprecedented caseloads and deaths; 
with observed exponential increase in the number of cases espe-
cially in the initial phase of transmission that occurred between 
July and December 2014; widespread distribution of cases in 
all wards; and a prolonged duration of the outbreak. While the 
outbreak was widespread, intense transmission and higher death 
rates were observed in some of the areas like Waterloo Area I, 
Allen Town I and II, Congo Water II, and Fourah Bay. Some 
of these areas registered disproportionate higher numbers of 
positive swabs, in the range of 41–49%. Although the reasons for 
intense transmissions in these areas are not so clear, we attribute 
these higher caseloads to a number of factors that includes the 
presence of slums associated with overcrowding and not very 
organized settlements that provide safe havens for transmission 
and to hide from stigma and discrimination. The high number 
of positive swabs, ranging between 30 and 49% in some of the 
wards, further confirms the community’s behavior of concealing 
exposure history and disease symptoms and going into hiding 
only to be identified after death.
Our study, thus, corroborated the findings by Ansumana 
et  al. (14), who reported that about 20% of individuals who 
died of EVD at the Ebola Treatment Center at Hastings Police 
Station in WA, died soon on arrival, meaning they presented 
for treatment late in the disease. Similar features character-
ized the outbreaks in the urban settings of Conakry, Guinea 
and Montserrado County of Liberia that experienced intense 
and prolonged transmission of EVD during this West African 
outbreak of Ebola (15, 16).
We did not examine the degree of spread from the capital city 
and urban setting of WA to other parts of the country in great 
details. However, we believe that the reported movements of the 
population, including of high-risk contacts and/or symptomatic 
individuals from WA into rural areas could have fueled trans-
mission to other parts of the country. The diverse ethnicity of 
the population in the capital, which represents all ethnicities in 
the country, meant that the introduction of the disease in such 
urban setting was quickly followed by geographic widespread 
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elsewhere, but also that ongoing transmissions in the districts 
could easily spill over into WA. Previous attempts to describe the 
transmission dynamics of Ebola in the urban cities of Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone attributed the intense transmission and 
high caseloads to weak health systems and uncontrolled popula-
tion movements (12, 17). Our study highlights the additional role 
of overcrowded settings coupled with fear, population behaviors, 
and lack of community trust in the response systems that mani-
fested in the widespread efforts to conceal exposure history and 
disease symptoms, reports of secret burials, a high proportion 
of positive swabs, a high proportion of confirmed cases with no 
reported contact information, and persistent reports of high-risk 
contacts lost to follow up.
Lessons can be derived from the response to the extension of 
the same West African Ebola outbreak into Lagos, Nigeria, which 
is home to more than 21 million inhabitants. The response to this 
outbreak during the second half of 2014, clearly demonstrated 
some of the essential elements and precursor to effective outbreak 
response in any setting. Thus, with the right level of anticipation 
and awareness, proper preparedness, early detection, and swift 
response, an outbreak with high potential to explode because of 
the context can actually be limited and contained with minimal 
consequential morbidity and mortality (18, 19).
This study found that the proportion men and women affected 
by the disease, including deaths were about the same, probably 
reflecting the gender characteristics of the populations in the WA 
urban setting. In Pejuhun, a district in the northeastern part of 
Sierra Leone, however, females were more affected than males 
and transmission occurred mostly among family members (20). 
Similar findings were exhibited during the 2000–2001 Ebola 
outbreak (7). In contrast, transmission in WAU occurred mainly 
between neighbors and friends. This transmission pattern could 
be attributed to the fact that people were living in overcrowded 
shared accommodations to share and subsidize rental costs, 
and that the people living in the same rented accommodation 
in WAU were not necessarily blood related. The high numbers 
of individuals under 30  years of age, affected by the outbreak 
reflects the general demographic profile of the country which is 
very young (21).
This study did not examine differences in the epidemiology 
of EVD in an urban versus rural setting. However, as reported 
by Dietz et al. (22), a 10-fold increase in the weekly incidence of 
EVD in WAU/Freetown Municipality compared to the weekly 
incidence in other parts of the country was observed at the 
peak of the outbreak in Sierra Leone. This escalated transmis-
sion pattern is perhaps largely attributed to overcrowding and 
dense population, fleeing of high-risk contacts and sick persons 
from quarantine homes in the provinces, delayed health-seeking 
behavior, delayed detection of cases, secret burials, and the 
very high numbers of positive swabs. All these factors imply 
prolonged contacts and exposures to highly infectious sympto-
matic and or dead bodies, resulting in widespread transmission 
at community level, further aggravated by very poor infection 
control practices.
The above arguments are aligned to the findings by Ansumana 
et al. (17), who observed that ill persons and their family mem-
bers routinely administered presumptive treatment of febrile 
illnesses and self-medicated with either over-the-counter medi-
cine or herbal concoctions from traditional healers. The authors 
attributed the upsurge and exponential increase in the number 
of cases in Sierra Leone during the period of up to December 
2014 to these behaviors. While these findings were also reported 
for WA, the ongoing EVD outbreak in surrounding Provinces 
was critical in sustaining and propagating local transmission 
in WA, particularly in Freetown and in Waterloo Area I Area I 
(Ward 330), the most densely populated cities as EVD high-risk 
contacts and patients fled quarantine homes from and into the 
provinces.
We report a relatively low-case fatality rate for the EVD 
outbreak in WA—a rate similar to those recorded in other areas 
of West Africa affected by this outbreak. Kucharski and Edmunds 
(23) have attributed the very low CFR for the West African 
Ebola outbreak to a failure to account for the delay between 
the onset of Ebola symptoms and disease outcomes (recovery or 
death). Our study provides additional insights derived from the 
outbreak context and community dynamics, and we attribute the 
very low case fatality for the outbreak in WA to a combination 
of factors. Thus, the diverse nature and ethnic representation of 
the population in WA, meant that some of the high-risk contacts 
and symptomatic individuals perhaps consciously returned to 
their home districts in the Provinces in search of nursing care 
and to be buried at home upon death; for some, fear and lack 
of trust in the response system may have resulted in high-risk 
contacts and symptomatic individuals fleeing into hiding; and 
possibly secret burials that were not captured in the data. If 
these were truly the case, then a significant proportion of the 
deaths attributable to EVD may have not been captured and 
accounted for, which may have resulted in the disease outcome 
variable skewed toward survival/recovery, depicted by the lower 
case fatality in WA.
In a similar vein, we believe that the very low proportion of 
confirmed cases with a reported history of contacts is partly due 
to the proactive concealment of exposure history by the affected 
communities and to inadequate surveillance system incapable 
of detecting cases early, especially in the early days of the epi-
demic. Hence, the delayed detection of cases and detection after 
death certainly played a critical role in the propagation and in 
sustained transmission. Delayed health-seeking behavior meant 
prolonged contact and exposure to others in the community 
and a community level amplification of transmission. This also 
confirms that the primary mode of EVD transmission in WA 
was person-to-person, as already reported by Park et al. (24) and 
Roels et al. (25).
We also note that this study registered a lower proportion of 
cases among health-care workers, a higher proportion of children 
infected, and a higher intra-community transmission, largely 
attributed to the behavior of community members. In contrast, 
a number of previous outbreaks in the rural settings, however, 
documented amplification of disease transmission in health-care 
settings (26–28).
study limitations
Due to our study design and scope, which was limited to urban 
and peri-urban settings of WA, we could not compare and 
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contrast EVD epidemiology in urban versus rural settings. The 
development and implementation of the surveillance system 
was slow and only became fully functional in the second half of 
the response. The negative behaviors of community members, 
such as concealing symptoms and conducting secret burials, 
could have resulted in a high number of missing individuals 
who died of the disease, especially early on in the outbreak. 
These people may not have been captured in the system, and 
neither do we have information about their characteristics. 
At the peak of the epidemic, the numbers of new cases and 
deaths overwhelmed the available capacities to systematically 
collect good data as per the surveillance protocol. Additionally, 
there was no capacity to adequately supervise the data collec-
tion. Consequently, the VHF database had missing variables, 
including exposure history which was largely derived from 
qualitative information. Additionally, it was not feasible to 
quantify the impact of the observed and reported drivers of 
transmission.
cOnclUsiOn
This study confirms the challenges and difficulties of containing 
an infectious disease outbreak in an urban setting with dynamic 
and unresponsive communities, and in the context of limited or 
no public health resources. With an estimated 4,955 cases identi-
fied in WA over a 15-month period, WA experienced an unprec-
edented outbreak of Ebola in history, affecting equal numbers 
of men and female, and with the two, Freetown Municipality, 
and Waterloo Area I in WAU and WAR, respectively, becoming 
transmission hubs linked to cases elsewhere. While our study 
identified a lot more cases and deaths from the VHF database 
compared to what was reported by MOHS and by WHO, even 
the figures presented may be an underestimate of the actual 
numbers of cases and deaths attributed to EVD in WA during 
this epidemic period.
The outbreak in WA was detected late when it was already 
widespread. The delayed detection, in the absence of prepared-
ness and swift response, resulted in the outbreak getting out 
of control. This unprecedented outbreak has been attributed 
to a number of factors; high population density, disorganized 
settlements, and slum areas, providing safe havens and hiding 
places for exposed and symptomatic individuals, uncontrolled 
population movements in and out of the WA, unfavorable 
behaviors among high-risk contacts and symptomatic individu-
als in communities such as hiding oneself and concealing disease 
symptoms, lack of trust in the response system, secret burials, 
and washing of dead bodies. The outbreak was characterized by 
intensive transmission at the community level. In WAU, most 
transmission occurred between non-related inhabitants of a 
shared accommodation and between neighbors. Additional 
potential routes of transmission, including through sex and 
breast milk have been reported.
The unique urban context and multi-ethnic nature of the WA, 
with linkages to all districts in Provinces elsewhere may have 
contributed to the sustained transmission and prolonged dura-
tion of the outbreak with infected and non-infected individuals 
moving in and out of the area. We were able to identify the 
significant role of fear, the lack of trust in the public health inter-
ventions, and the deeply ingrained sociocultural practices such 
as the washing of dead bodies—all of which led to propagation 
and sustained transmission, disease escalation, and widespread 
distribution of cases.
Anticipation of risks from an ongoing outbreak coupled 
with implementation of preparedness and mitigation meas-
ures in at-risk areas remains critical for early detection of 
disease expansion and swift response. This is even more 
critical if the at-risk areas are urban settings with potential 
for epidemic explosion following introduction. Response to 
future outbreaks in similar context should, therefore, be swift, 
comprehensive and build on the knowledge and understanding 
of the affected communities. Prioritization of strategic and 
targeted community mobilization and engagement activities to 
positively influence perceptions and practices is also impor-
tant. Furthermore, good quality data are crucial for effective 
outbreak control and should be prioritized even more in the 
urban setting where community dynamics may complicate 
the disease epidemiology and control efforts. In such settings, 
steps should be taken to prioritize and ensure the immediate 
establishment of a robust active surveillance system able to 
capture all cases and generate relevant information for effective 
and timely intervention.
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